Trump vs Learning Resources INC over Tariffs. When Common Sense and Congressional Practice Converge
- Ramiro Morales
- Feb 21
- 5 min read
In a 6–3 decision, the Supreme Court held that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) does not authorize the President to impose tariffs on nearly every trading partner. The question presented was direct: whether IEEPA permits the Executive to exercise the tariff power. The controversy arose after President Trump invoked IEEPA to respond to two perceived foreign threats: the influx of illegal drugs from Canada, Mexico, and China, and “large and persistent” trade deficits. Acting under Presidential Proclamations and Executive Orders, the Administration imposed reciprocal tariffs of at least 10 percent on all imports, with higher rates for dozens of nations, and later modified them repeatedly.
The challengers included two small businesses plaintiffs in Learning Resources who filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. These companies, rather than multinational conglomerates, became the true institutional counterweight in this litigation. Their position reflects a broader constitutional truth: structural safeguards exist not only for states or large corporations, but for ordinary market participants whose survival depends on predictable law. In practical and economic terms, small enterprises were the most immediate bearers of the tariffs’ costs. As noted by the Tax Foundation, the IEEPA tariffs were estimated to reduce long-run U.S. GDP by 0.3 percent. Even after the ruling, Section 232 tariffs remain and are projected to raise $635 billion over the next decade and cost U.S. households approximately $400 on average in 2026. The macroeconomic analysis reinforces what common sense suggests: trade measures of this scale directly affect domestic producers, retailers, and consumers.
I. The Constitutional Allocation of the Taxing Power
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution vests in Congress the power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises. The Court reaffirmed that the power to impose tariffs is “very clear[ly]” a branch of the taxing power, echoing Gibbons v. Ogden. The Framers, having revolted against taxation without representation, gave Congress alone “access to the pockets of the people,” as stated in The Federalist No. 48. They further required that all bills for raising revenue originate in the House of Representatives. The Executive was not granted any share of this authority.
The Government conceded that the President possesses no inherent peacetime power to impose tariffs. Its defense relied exclusively on IEEPA. Yet constitutional structure matters. The separation of powers is not a technicality; it is the means by which the principle of no taxation without representation is preserved. When the Executive claims unilateral authority to raise revenue, it implicates the very allocation the Framers guarded most jealously.
Dissenting voices offered a different perspective. Justice Kavanaugh emphasized the President’s independent constitutional authority in foreign affairs and suggested that statutory ambiguity in that sphere may warrant broader interpretation. Justice Thomas went further, questioning whether the major questions doctrine should constrain Congress’s ability to delegate expansive powers, including tariff authority. Justice Kagan, joined by others, argued that ordinary tools of statutory interpretation were sufficient and that the doctrine was unnecessary in this case. These views reflect an enduring tension between functional flexibility in foreign affairs and strict structural adherence to Article I.
II. The Major Questions Doctrine and Delegation
The majority applied the major questions doctrine. Where the Executive claims extraordinary authority of vast economic and political significance, clear congressional authorization is required. The imposition of sweeping, global tariffs of unlimited scope and duration qualifies as such an extraordinary power. The Government argued that IEEPA’s broad language, addressing national emergencies and foreign threats, justified a correspondingly broad delegation. The Court rejected the proposition that statutes addressing major problems automatically confer all major powers for which there may be a colorable textual basis. There is, as the Court stated, no “major questions exception” to the major questions doctrine. If anything, it is in such cases that courts must be alert to sweeping delegations lurking in ambiguous text.
Common sense suggests that if Congress intended to delegate a power as consequential as the tariff power, it would have done so expressly. Congressional practice confirms this expectation.
III. Interpreting “Regulate” in §1702(a)(1)(B) of IEEPA
IEEPA authorizes the President to “investigate, block, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit” importation or exportation. Notably absent is any reference to tariffs or duties. The Government contended that the power to “regulate” importation encompasses the authority to impose tariffs.
The Court disagreed. The ordinary meaning of “regulate” involves directing by rule or restriction, adjusting by established methods, or subjecting conduct to governing principles. While taxation can have regulatory effects, it does not follow that the power to regulate includes the power to tax. The Court observed that the U.S. Code contains numerous grants of authority to “regulate,” yet none has been understood to include an implicit power to impose taxes. If “regulate” included taxation here, the other verbs in the statute would risk redundancy.
Moreover, taxing exports is expressly forbidden by Article I, Section 9. A reading of “regulate” that sweeps in taxation would raise serious constitutional concerns. The canon of constitutional avoidance thus reinforces the narrower interpretation.
IV. Historical Practice and Express Delegations
When Congress has delegated tariff authority, it has done so in explicit terms and with defined limits. Statutes routinely refer to “duties,” “rates of duty,” or “import surcharges.” These delegations are accompanied by procedural constraints and substantive standards. By contrast, IEEPA contains no mention of tariffs in its half century of existence. No President had previously invoked it to impose tariffs of this magnitude or scope. The lack of historical precedent, coupled with the breadth of authority claimed, served as a telling indication that the asserted power exceeded legitimate reach.
The Government and dissenting opinions invoked foreign affairs precedents and historical wartime cases, as well as decisions such as Federal Energy Administration v. Algonquin SNG, Inc. Yet those cases involved distinct statutory language and narrower contexts. They did not establish that an emergency statute authorizing regulation of imports silently transfers the core taxing power.
Against this backdrop, the majority concluded that accepting the Government’s interpretation would represent a transformative expansion of presidential authority over tariff policy, effectively enabling unilateral revenue-raising upon declaration of a national emergency. That outcome would invert the separation of powers and undermine the doctrine of no taxation without representation.
V. Economic and Policy Implications: The Tax Foundation’s Assessment and the Prospect of a New Global Tariff
The Tax Foundation anticipated that the ruling would provide relief from the IEEPA tariffs, while noting that Section 232 tariffs remain in force. According to its estimates, those measures will generate significant federal revenue and impose measurable household costs. The Foundation further observed that uncertainty persists, as the Administration may turn to other statutory authorities Section 232, Section 301, Section 122, or Section 338 to impose additional tariffs.
Recent reporting by BBC and CNN indicates that the Administration is considering a new 10% global tariff framework to replace the invalidated measures. If such tariffs are pursued under alternative statutory authorities, tariff-related economic headwinds could intensify rather than dissipate. The legal debate may therefore shift from IEEPA to other trade statutes, but the underlying constitutional question how far Congress may delegate its tariff power will remain central.
Conclusion
What common sense suggests, congressional practice confirms. The power to tax, including the power to impose tariffs, resides in Congress. Delegations of that power have historically been explicit and bounded. The separation of powers, rooted in the rejection of taxation without representation, demands clarity when core legislative authority is transferred. The Supreme Court’s decision does not eliminate trade policy disputes. It reaffirms that, even in matters touching foreign affairs and national emergencies, constitutional structure endures. The dissenting opinions underscore the competing values of flexibility and textual breadth, yet the majority insists that extraordinary power requires unmistakable legislative command.
This blog relies exclusively on the Supreme Court’s opinion in Case No. 24-1287, reporting by the BBC and CNN, and analysis published by the Tax Foundation regarding the economic effects of the tariffs and related trade measures.
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